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I.. LIMITED SALES, EXCISE, AND USE TAX
A. Application of the Tax
I 'OMPTROLLER of Public Accounts v. Austin Multiple Listing Ser-
fvice, Inc. I focused on the distinction between sales of taxable property
and sales of nontaxable services. Austin Multiple Listing Service
(Austin Service) paid Multi-List Inc. to compile, process, and print Austin
real estate information in a weekly booklet. The comptroller asserted that
the sales involved both services and tangible personal property and alleged
taxability on the theory that the essence of the transactions consisted of the
printing and distribution of the books. The taxpayer argued that the sales
involved only nontaxable services. In holding for the taxpayer, the court
reiterated that the test for deciding the taxability of a transaction consists of
determining the ultimate object or the essence of the transaction, adding that
taxing statutes must be strictly construed against the taxing authority. 2 The
court noted that the real estate data had a short useful life, that the data
could be transmitted in a variety of forms, and that Multi-List relied upon its
customer to supply the data.3
In Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc.4 Texas Monthly alleged that the sales
tax exemption in section 151.312 of the Tax Code for religious periodicals
constituted an unlawful discrimination based on the content of the maga-
zine, and therefore violated the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution, and article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas.
1. 723 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
2. Id. at 165.
3. Id. at 165-66. The court relied in part on Geomap Co. v. Bullock, 691 S.W.2d 98, 100
(Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Williams & Lee Scouting Serv., Inc. v. Cal-
vert, 452 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd). Despite 1987 legislative
changes concerning taxation of services, (see infra notes 31-71 and accompanying text), the
"essence of the transaction" test should remain of critical importance for distinguishing taxa-
ble sales from nontaxable sales. See Comptroller Hearings No. 21,164 (May 19, 1987) and No.
19,085 (July 7, 1987). But see Comptroller Hearing No. 18,361 (Jan. 12, 1987) ("essence of the
transaction" test not applied to services).
4. 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For changes made with
respect to magazine taxation since this case, see infra note 92.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The district court held for Texas Monthly, but the appeals court reversed. 5
In an opinion that relied primarily on United States Supreme Court cases 6
the appellate court concluded that the exemption did not violate the equal
protection clause or the prohibition against establishment of religion in the
United States Constitution. 7 The court reasoned that the law does not bind
the legislature to tax every member of a class so long as the legislature's
distinctions have a rational basis.8 The effect of the religious tax exemption
must also permit religious organizations to remain independent of govern-
ment support.9 The court further concluded that Texas Monthly did not
meet its burden of establishing that the failure of the legislature to exempt
other types of publication in any way restricted the right of Texas Monthly
to free speech.10
Texas Monthly contrasts with Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,"
in which the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Arkan-
sas tax exemption for certain periodicals. The Texas court attempted to
distinguish Ragland on the ground that the breadth of Ragland's exemption
reduced the quantity of magazines subject to tax to a very small group,
whereas the Texas Monthly appeal presented the opposite situation.' 2
Other sales tax cases rendered during the survey period include Direlco
Inc. v. Bullock 13 and State v. Glass.14 Direlco upheld the comptroller's inter-
pretation of "commercial use" for purposes of determining the taxability for
certain gas and electricity use. 15 Glass denied an exemption from diesel fuel
tax, in part, on the well established principles that the comptroller's tax defi-
ciency creates a presumption of taxability and that courts will strictly con-
strue statutory exemptions from tax against the taxpayer. 16
The so-called "sixty-day rule," which requires that a taxpayer present its
resale certificates to the comptroller within sixty days of the auditor's writ-
ten request, 17 gave rise to a substantial number of administrative decisions.
5. 731 S.W.2d at 166.
6. The court relied in particular on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
7. 731 S.W.2d at 165.
8. Id. at 163.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 165. Judge Carroll's dissenting opinion concluded not only that the Texas Con-
stitution contemplates a "stronger belief in the separation of church and state" than does the
United States Constitution, id. at 167 n. 1, but also that the challenged exemption constitutes
an unconstitutional infringement of the establishment clause of the United States Constitution.
The dissent further concluded that taxing religious periodicals would result in even greater
entanglement between church and state and advocated striking the tax as it applies to all
periodicals.
11. 107A S. Ct. 1722, 1730 (1987).
12. 731 S.W.2d at 165.
13. 711 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. 723 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The definition of "com-
mercial use" was modified by Act of July 21, 1987, ch. 5, art. 1, pt. 4, § 25 (2d Called Session),
1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 17 (Vernon) [hereinafter cited as House Bill 61 or H.B. 61] (codified
at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
15. 711 S.W.2d at 364.
16. 723 S.W.2d at 327.
17. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.054(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit.
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In general, these decisions reiterate the comptroller's position that: the re-
quirement applies to sales made prior to October 2, 1984, the effective date
of the law;' 8 the requirement must be strictly interpreted;19 and certain alter-
native proof (rather than resale certificates) may be accepted with respect to
transactions that occurred prior to October 2, 1984.20
As in other years, administrative decisions illustrate that a taxpayer may
be entitled to relief if the taxpayer can demonstrate detrimental reliance on
erroneous advice given by a representative of the comptroller's office.
Although the decisions lack consistency on a theoretical basis, they do set
forth criteria necessary to illustrate detrimental reliance.21
Several of the comptroller's decisions dealt with exemptions from sales
tax. Decisions 18,847 and 16,489 illustrate the comptroller's established po-
sition that a sale by a third party that has received property in a foreclosure
or similar proceeding cannot qualify as an occasional sale. 22 In Decision
17,12423 the administrative law judge permitted an exemption for an occa-
sional sale of "the entire operating assets of a business or of a separate divi-
sion, branch, or identifiable segment of a business" 24 within the meaning of
section 151.304(b)(2) of the Tax Code. The taxpayer received the exemption
despite the tax division's argument that the drilling rigs sold were not actu-
ally used in a business activity because no income had been recognized with
respect to them.2" The administrative law judge held, however, that the key
factor was not whether the seller actually used the rig, but whether the seller
bought the rig in the pursuit of its business activity. 26 Although the comp-
34, §§ 3.282, .285, .286, .287. See also infra note 85-86 and accompanying text (concerning
legislative changes to the 60-day rule).
18. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 18,011 (Dec. 3, 1987).
19. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 20,866 (May 4, 1987).
20. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 19,204 (Oct. 20, 1987); see also Comptroller Hear-
ings No. 19,425 (Jan. 8, 1987); No. 18,631 (Feb. 10, 1986) (discussion of the development of
the 60-day rule).
21. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearings No. 20,821 (May 18, 1987); No. 20,177 (Apr. 16,
1987); No. 17,565 (Mar. 11, 1987).
22. Comptroller Hearings No. 18,847 (Apr. 6, 1987); No. 16,489 (Apr. 22, 1987). Each of
these decisions involved a purportedly exempt sale pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.304 (Vernon 1987).
23. Comptroller Hearing No. 17,124 (Dec. 5, 1986).
24. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
25. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 19,620 (Oct. 7, 1986) (sale held taxable because the
taxpayer failed to meet burden of proving that income and expenses of a division could be
separately established from the books and records).
26. See also Comptroller's Hearing No. 19,708 (Oct. 6, 1986) (sale need not include
seller's inventory to qualify as occasional "sale of the entire operating assets of a business"
under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988)); Comptroller Hearing No.
19,278 (May 7, 1987) (taxpayer who did not hold himself out as engaging in the business of
selling taxable items at retail qualified for exemption from sales tax on a sale from one or two
taxable items; taxpayer could not, however, qualify for a credit available under TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 151.427 (Vernon 1982) to a seller who sells in the regular course of its business)
(although this decision deals with rentals, which fail to qualify for occasional sales tax treat-
ment under current law, see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988), the
principles outlined in the decision would apply to other occasional sales); Comptroller Hearing
No. 20,567 (Feb. 24, 1988) (sale did not qualify under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2)




troller generally refuses to consider constitutional arguments, 27 the comp-
troller set aside an audit in Decision 19,49128 on equal protection grounds
after finding that the comptroller had audited but not taxed another com-
pany that engaged in exactly the same business as the audited taxpayer.29
B. Legislative Developments
Legislative developments provided the most significant changes in Texas
sales tax law during the survey period. The legislature increased the state
sales tax rate to 6%,30 extended the services subject to tax, and made numer-
ous other changes.
Amusement Services. Although Texas first taxed certain amusement serv-
ices in 1984,31 additional amusement services are now taxable, including
membership in a private club.32 The legislature also made conforming
changes to the definitions of "sale" or "purchase" 33 and "sales price."'34
Modification of section 151.3101 of the Tax Code tightened tax exemptions
for amusement services by stating that the services qualify for exemption
only if exclusively provided by the specifically exempted provider.35 This
change could heavily impact events co-sponsored by commercial entities,
such as charity sports events co-sponsored by a radio station or other com-
mercial venture.
Credit Reporting Services. Texas now taxes credit reporting services, which
the state defines as assembling or furnishing credit history or credit informa-
tion that relates to any person.36 An emergency rule promulgated by the
comptroller defines credit reporting services as the assembling or furnishing
a credit report, or part of a credit report, for fees or other consideration.
The rule broadly defines credit report as including any written, oral, or other
compilation of credit history or other information that has a bearing on a
27. See, e.g., Comptroller Hearing No. 18,858 (Apr. 1, 1987) (citing Texas State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Walgreen Texas Co., 520 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
28. Comptroller Hearing No. 19,491 (Oct. 6, 1986).
29. Id.
30. H.B. 61, pt. 1; The legislature increased the rate effective October 1, 1987. See id.; Act
of July 21, 1987, ch. 8 (2d Called Session), 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 88 (Vernon) [hereinafter
cited as H.B. 176]. Total state and local tax can be as high as 8%.
31. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.0101, .0028 (Vernon Supp. 1987); TEX. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 34, § 3.298; see also Comptroller Hearings No. 19,985 (Jan. 23, 1987); No. 19,734
(Mar. 13, 1987) (addressing scope of amusement services).
32. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0028(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Oct. 1, 1987). See
H.B. 61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 38; H.B. 176, § 1.
33. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.005(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
34. Id. § 151.007(e). This section includes initiation fees in the sales price. But see 12
Tex. Reg. 3624 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.298) (emergency rule adopted Sept. 30, 1987).
Contrast this version of the rule with 12 Tex. Reg. 1827 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.298)
(amendments proposed Feb. 17, 1988).
35. H.B. 61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 22; see also 12 Tex. Reg. 3624 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34,
§ 3.298) (emergency rule adopted Sept. 30, 1987).
36. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0034 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Oct. 1, 1987); see H.B.
61, art. 1, pt. § 38; H.B. 176.
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person's credit status or insurability. 37 The rule requires the provider of
credit services to collect sales tax if the anticipated transaction that causes
the request for credit will occur in Texas, the address of the credit applicant
at the time of the request is in Texas, and the requestor of the credit report is
located in Texas or doing business in Texas as provided in section 151.107 of
the Tax Code. 38 According to spokespersons in the comptroller's office, the
rule's intent is to provide a two-prong test: the subject of the credit report
must be located in Texas, and the person requesting the credit report must
be doing business in Texas. This test is designed to avoid the difficulty of
attempting to allocate the use of credit reporting services between in-state
and out-of-state.
Data Processing. In 1984 the state began taxing sales of computer programs
other than certain custom programs. 39 Data processing services newly sub-
ject to tax under 1987 legislation include: word processing; data entry, re-
trieval, and search; information compilation; payroll and business
accounting; data production; and other computerized data and information
storage or manipulation. 40 This category also includes the use of a computer
or computer time for data processing, whether performed by the party who
provides the computer access or by the purchaser or other beneficiary of the
service.4 ' Due to conforming changes, the definition of tangible personal
property no longer excludes custom computer programs.42 Although the
legislature intended to tax the growing number of service-oriented data
processing companies, the broad statutory definition of data processing
could apply to a very wide range of companies and services, including data
processing incidental to reporting by credit card companies and accounting
firms. However, the data processing rule provides a more restrictive defini-
tion, and specifically provides that data processing does not include com-
puter use to facilitate another service (for example, an accountant's use to
produce financial reports). 43 In addition, unrelated, distinct services that are
commonly provided on a stand-alone basis are not taxable."
37. 12 Tex. Reg. 3628 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.343) (emergency rule adopted
Sept. 30, 1987). This rule, like other emergency service rules, provides that if the seller is not
doing business in Texas and is not required to collect Texas tax, reporting the tax becomes the
Texas customer's responsibility. See also 12 Tex. Reg. 4771 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34,
§ 3.343) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
38. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.343. The statute treats credit card companies as doing
business in Texas if the financial institution issuing the card does business in Texas or if the
credit card company is "otherwise doing business in Texas." Id § 3.343(b)(1)(c).
39. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.0031 (Vernon Supp. 1988), .0032 (repealed 1987),
.009 (Vernon Supp. 1988), which treat noncustom computer programs as tangible personal
property, and therefore subject to sales tax.
40. Id. § 151.0035 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Jan. 1, 1988, id. § 151.0101(a)(12)).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 151.009; see 12 Tex. Reg. 4787 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.308) (adopted
Dec. 9, 1987) (amending comptroller's regulatory definitions of canned and custom software,
and making software and installation changes taxable).
43. See 12 Tex. Reg. 4723 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.330) (emergency rule adopted
Dec. 10, 1987); see also 13 Tex. Reg. 1179 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.330 (proposed Feb.
26, 1988).
44. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.330(d).
1988]
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Debt Collection Services. The legislature also imposed sales tax on debt col-
lection service, which it defined as an activity to collect or adjust a debt or
claim, or to repossess property subject to a claim. 45 The legislation specifi-
cally provides that debt collection service does not include the collection of
judgments by attorneys if the attorney represented the person in the suit that
generated the judgment.46 The fact that the legislature specifically consid-
ered attorneys created the implication that attorneys' fees for debt collection
might be taxable. However, most attorneys' fees are exempt according to an
opinion by the attorney general. 47 The emergency rule with respect to debt
collection services48 offers additional guidance as to what constitutes debt
collection.
Information Services. The legislature also made information services subject
to tax.49 These services are defined to include: (1) furnishing general or
specialized news or other current information, including financial informa-
tion, except for information furnished to a general circulation newspaper
published at least weekly, or to a federally licensed radio or television sta-
tion; or (2) electronic data retrieval or research. 50 The comptroller's emer-
gency rule5' essentially tracks the statutory definition of information
services, but adds language that extends to various means of information
transmission in effect now or in the future, including electrical transmission,
microwaves, satellites, or fiber optics. 5 2 The state taxes information gath-
ered, maintained, compiled, and made available to the public or to a specific
segment of industry (such as newsletters, oil and gas scouting reports and
surveys, mailing lists), but exempts information of a proprietary nature gath-
ered or compiled on behalf of a particular client (such as opinion polls, poly-
graph tests, account balances, and other information not for resale). 53 Both
the statute54 and the emergency rule55 include exceptions for information
45. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Oct. 1, 1987); see H.B.
61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 38; H.B. 176.
46. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
47. The attorney general's opinion addresses fees to date of judgment for the following:
collection of open accounts and debts; filing bankruptcy claims; land foreclosures; enforcing
contracts that involve a monetary dispute; enforcing a judgment without having obtained thejudgment; negotiating debt and claim adjustments; and enforcing insurance claims. The opin-
ion concludes that legal services are taxable only if the lawyer is acting "as nothing more than a
debt collector." Although the definition of "claim" in 12 Tex. Reg. 3629 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 34, § 3.354) (emergency rule adopted Sept. 30, 1987) is broad enough to encompass virtu-
ally all litigation fees, such fees should not be taxable. See 12 Tex. Reg. 4772 (TEX. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 34, § 3.354) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987); 13 Tex. Reg. 1222 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit.
34, § 3.354 (adopted Mar. 3, 1988).
48. 12 Tex. Reg. 3629 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.354).
49. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0035 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
50. Id. This provision makes LEXIS, WESTLAW, and similar services taxable.
51. 12 Tex. Reg. 3627 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342) (emergency rule adopted on
Sept. 30, 1987); see 12 Tex. Reg. 4769 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342) (proposed Dec. 10,
1987); 13 Tex., Reg. 1230 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342 (adopted Feb. 26, 1988).
52. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342(a)(1).
53. Id. § 3.342(e), (g).
54. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0038 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
55. 12 Tex. Reg. 3627 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342(f)) (emergency rule adopted
on Sept. 30, 1987); see TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342 (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
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services sold to certain newspapers, radio, or television stations if the seller
obtains an exemption certificate. The certificate must state that the pur-
chaser is a newspaper with a general circulation published at least weekly or
a station licensed by FCC.56
Insurance Service. The numerous statutes affecting insurance taxation ex-
ceed the scope of this Article. Certain insurance taxation provisions in the
1987 legislation, however, merit discussion. The statute defines taxable in-
surance services as: "[1] insurance loss or damage appraisal, [2] insurance
inspection, [3] insurance investigation, [4] insurance actuarial analysis or re-
search, [5] insurance claims adjustment or claims processing, or [6] insur-
ance loss prevention service. ' '57 The definition excludes, however, payment
of premiums for insurance coverage, or payment of commissions to insur-
ance agents for the sale of insurance or annuities.58 An emergency rule is-
sued by the comptroller defines each of the six components of insurance
service listed by the statute and provides additional guidance for determining
which services are taxable.59 A revised version of this rule6° has been
proposed.
Real Property Repair and Remodeling. The new legislation also makes re-
pair and remodeling services taxable.61 Such services include repairing, re-
storing, remodeling, or modifying an improvement to real property other
than certain described structures or improvements (intended to cover certain
residential property).62  Other legislative provisions made conforming
changes to the Tax Code,63 and an emergency administrative rule provides
further guidance.64
Real Property Services. Newly taxable real property services include land-
scaping, lawn care, garbage collection, building or grounds cleaning, certain
56. 12 Tex. Reg. 3627 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.342(f)); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 151.0038 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
57. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0039 (Vernon Supp. 1988). (eff. Oct. 1, 1987); see H.B.
61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 38; H.B. 176; see also H.B. 61 treatment of third-party plan administrators
(discussed infra at notes 95-100 and accompanying text).
58. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0039 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
59. 12 Tex. Reg. 3630 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.355) (emergency rule adopted
Sept. 30, 1987); see 12 Tex. Reg. 4774 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.355) (proposed Dec. 10,
1987).
60. 12 Tex. Reg. 4774 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.355) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
Certain changes to the form of the emergency rule resulted in unintended substantive changes
(concerning the definition of insurance service) that were corrected in the proposed rule. See
13 Tex. Reg. 1224 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.355) (adopted Mar. 3, 1988).
61. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0047 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Jan. 1, 1988); see id
§ 151.0101(a)(13).
62. Id. § 151.0047.
63. See id. § 151.058, which provides that "(a) A person performing repair services taxa-
ble under this chapter is the consumer of machinery and equipment used in performing the
service," and that "(b) the total amount charged for a repair service taxable under this chapter
is subject to tax, including charges for labor, materials, overhead, and profit."
64. 12 Tex. Reg. 4724 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.357) (emergency rule adopted Dec.
10, 1987); see 13 Tex. Reg. 1180 (TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.357 (proposed Feb. 26, 1988).
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structural pest control services, and the surveying of real property, 65
although the statute exempts certain yard maintenance by individuals under
eighteen years old. 66 An emergency rule67 defines each of the subcategories
of real property services subject to tax, defines employee/employer relation-
ship, and provides additional guidance.68
Security Services. Texas now taxes security services.69 Under the relevant
emergency rule, the category includes services provided as an investigations
company, guard company, or alarm system company.70 Nontaxable security
services include services by an employee for his employer in the regular
course of business within the scope of the employee's duties, for which the
employee is paid his regular wages or salary. 71
Exemptions and Grandfathering. The legislature specifically exempted from
taxation service transactions among affiliated entities, at least one of which is
a corporation, that report their income to the Internal Revenue Service on a
single consolidated return for the tax year in which the transaction occurs.72
By providing that an "affiliated entity" 73 includes entities that would other-
wise be excluded from the category pursuant to restrictions imposed by sec-
tion 1504 of the Internal Revenue Code, the legislature made clear that at
least those corporations are included in the definition of affiliated entities. A
prior draft of the bill referred to "corporations" instead of "entities." The
change to the broader designation would apparently include associations
treated as corporations for federal income tax, but not state law purposes.
The term may even extend to partnerships comprised of corporations that
report income on a consolidated return. This exemption applies only to a
service that would not have been taxable on September 1, 1987,74 and the
service-provider may not purchase for resale services exempted under this
65. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0048 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Oct. 1, 1987); see H.B.
61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 8; H.B. 176.
66. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.347 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
67. 12 Tex. Reg. 3631 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.356) (emergency rule adopted
Sept. 30, 1987); see 12 Tex. Reg. 4775 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.356) (proposed Dec. 10,
1987); 13 Tex. Reg. 1343 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.356 (adopted Mar. 11, 1988).
68. The rule provides several examples of taxable and nontaxable services, and provides,
inter alia, exemption for certain services provided by landscape designers or landscape
architects.
69. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0075 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (eff. Oct. 1, 1987); see H.B.
61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 38; H. B. 176. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0075 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
defines "Security Service" as "service for which a license is required under ... Art. 4413
(29bb) (Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes)." 12 Tex. Reg. 3626 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34,
§ 3.333) (emergency rule adopted Sept. 30, 1987) specifically provides tax exemption for per-
sons not subject to the licensing requirements of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(29bb),
§ 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988), and provides examples. See 12 Tex. Reg. 4768 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 34, § 3.333) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987); 13 Tex. Reg. 1221 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34,
§ 3.333 (adopted Feb. 26, 1988).
70. 12 Tex. Reg. 3626 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.333).
71. Id.






The new sales tax legislation also includes two separate grandfather provi-
sions. One of these exempts certain receipts from the difference between the
new 6% sales tax rate and the old 5.25% rate (but not from the 5.25% rate).
One of two preconditions must be met. Under the first option, items sold
must be used for the performance of a contract entered into on or before July
21, 1987, and the contract cannot be subject to change by reason of the tax
rate increase. Under the alternative provision, the exemption applies to the
taxable items used pursuant to bid obligations submitted on or before July
21, 1987, if the bid may not be withdrawn, modified, or changed by reason of
the rate increase. In addition to satisfying one of these tests, the taxpayer
must provide the comptroller with notice of the contract or bid within sixty
days after the effective date of the tax.76 The exemption expires after July 1,
1990.7 7
The second grandfather clause creates a complete, temporary exemption
from the service tax for certain receipts from the sale, use, or rental and the
storage, use, or other consumption in this state of items or services that be-
come subject to tax under the new law.78 Such receipts are exempt from the
sales tax if the items or services comprise the subject of a written contract or
bid entered into on or before July 21, 1987. 79 This exemption has no effect
after January 1, 1990.80 An administrative rule provides some insight into
the interpretation of these provisions.81 A proposed rule further provides
that a transferee of a contract can maintain the prior contract exemption if
the transferee is also bound by the contract.8 2
Despite (and because of) the extensive legislative changes and the nearly
immediate regulatory guidance from the comptroller, many unanswered
questions concerning the new services taxes still remain. For example, what
constitutes taxable use in Texas? The new law exempts services performed
for use outside this state, and provides that services performed for use both
within and outside this state are exempt to the extent the services are for use
75. Id.
76. H. B. 61, art. 1, pt. 3, § 4. Representatives from the comptroller's office have indi-
cated, however, that they do not expect to receive contracts, and that taxpayers should instead
keep contracts available for audit. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319(d).
77. Id.
78. H.B. 61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 36. Although the two statutes will likely be similarly inter-
preted in some respects, the comptroller's office has indicted informally that it does recognize
that the two exemptions are subject to different standards. See also 12 Tex. Reg. 3626 (TEx.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319) (emergency amendment to TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319)
(adopted Sept. 30, 1987); 12 Tex. Reg. 4767 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319) (amendment
proposed Dec. 10, 1987); 13 Tex. Reg. 1340 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319 (adopted
Mar. 11, 1988). At least a portion of this rule will apply only to the rate increase exemption.
79. H.B. 61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 36; see also Calvert v. British-American Oil Producing Co.,
397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1966) (interprets a similarly worded prior contract exemption statute
very narrowly); Comptroller Hearing No. 15,762 (Mar. 10, 1986) (interpreting a prior contract
exemption with respect to a 1978 tax).
80. H.B. 61, art. 1, pt. 4, § 36.
81. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319; see supra note 78; 12 Tex. Reg. 4767 (TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
82. 12 Tex. Reg. 4767 (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.319) (proposed Dec. 10, 1987).
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outside this state. The exemptions, however, do not apply to services per-
formed outside Texas but for use within Texas.83 Further administrative
and judicial interpretation will likely be necessary to resolve numerous ques-
tions. For example, where are information services or data processing serv-
ices used? How can a taxpayer distinguish between taxable and nontaxable
services? Although the administrative rules offer some guidance in these ar-
eas,8 4 many questions remain. Texas's new service taxes will surely produce
additional costs to service businesses not only as a direct result of the sales
tax liability itself, but also as a result of the additional complexity of doing
business. For many companies, the service taxes will require businesses to
revise some traditionally used contracts in order to segregate certain serv-
ices, based on location and taxability.
The 1987 legislation also modified the requirements concerning resale cer-
tificates. Section 151.054 of the Tax Code provides that, in order to deduct
the amount of a sale for resale from the total sales amount subject to tax, the
seller must obtain resale certificates within sixty days of written request from
the comptroller.8 5 The new law tightens the resale rule by requiring that the
seller must not only acquire the resale certificates within sixty days of the
written request, but must also deliver them to the comptroller within that
time period.8 6 Another change to section 151.151 of the Tax Code deleted
the language that permitted a purchaser to give a resale certificate if, at time
of sale, the purchaser was unable to ascertain whether property would be
held for resale.8 7
The legislature has also expanded the sales tax base by attempting to ex-
pand significantly the class of persons and activities subject to Texas sales
tax. The legislature redefined the activities that constitute being engaged in
business by a retailer.88 Activities subject to tax now include: deriving rent-
83. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.330(e), (f), (g) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The Tax Code
further provides that with respect to a taxable service, "use" means deriving direct or indirect
benefit from the service in Texas. The term does not include: the sale of a taxable service in
the regular course of business, "the transfer of a taxable service as an integral part of the
transfer of tangible personal property in the regular course of business," or the transfer of
tangible personal property as an integral part of the transfer of a taxable service in the regular
course of business. Id. § 151.01 1(b), (c).
84. The rules cited supra in notes 34, 37, 43, 48, 51, 59, 61, 67, and 70 generally presume
taxability on the total charge when nontaxable unrelated services and taxable services are sold
or purchased for a single charge. That presumption, however, may be overcome by the seller
at the time the transaction occurs by separately stating to the customer a reasonable charge for
the taxable services. The seller's books must support the apportionment between exempt and
nonexempt activities based on the cost of providing the service or on a comparison to the
normal charge for each service if provided alone. The comptroller will adjust the charges if the
charge for exempt services appears unreasonable upon review of the overall transaction, con-
sidering the cost of providing the service or a comparable charge made in the industry for each
service. The rules further provide that charges for services or expenses connected to the provi-
sion of a taxable service may not be separated for the purpose of excluding these charges from
the tax base. The rules also provide fairly straightforward tests, designed to avoid more com-
plex allocation among various cities, counties, or MTAs, and provide rules for resale
certificates.
85. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
86. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.054(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
87. Id. § 151.151.
88. Id. § 151.107.
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als from a lease of tangible personal property situated in Texas; soliciting
orders for taxable items by means of broadcasting, printing, or distributing
advertisements from a Texas location (if intended for Texas consumers and
only secondarily disseminated to bordering jurisdictions); certain soliciting
of orders for taxable items by mail or through other media and subject to (or
permitted to be subject to) Texas jurisdiction for tax purposes under federal
law; and having a franchisee or licensee operating under its trade name if the
franchisee or licensee is required to collect tax.89 In view of the breadth of
the statutory language, past court decisions limiting state jurisdiction over
mail order companies, 90 and proposed federal legislation on the same sub-
ject,9 1 the scope of these provisions could become a significant issue.
In addition to the significant expansion of the sales tax base, the Texas
Legislature made several other changes. 92 The state imposes a $110 annual
fee on certain professionals, including attorneys.9 3 Although most of the
new legislation adversely affected taxpayers, the state provided a few relief
items. In addition to creating a few new exemptions to sales taxes, Texas
enacted a limited credit for manufacturing, effective beginning in 1990. The
credit will eventually phase out sales tax for certain manufacturing
equipment. 94
The legislature also imposed a controversial tax on third-party plan ad-
ministrators of welfare benefit plans.95 A discussion of this tax, which is
technically part of the Texas Insurance Code, exceeds the scope of this Arti-
cle. Judicial intervention, however, will likely be necessary to resolve satis-
factorily the legal issues raised. In brief, the new legislation imposes an
"Administrative Services Tax" on plan administrators. 96 The state imposes
an annual tax of 2.5% on the gross amount of administrative or service fees
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U. S. 753 (1967).
91. See, e.g., S. 639 and S. 1099, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1242, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987).
92. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.423 (reducing from 1% to 0.5% the collection
fee a taxpayer may keep); § 151.201 (sales tax permit and renewal fees); § 151.314 (food and
food products); § 151.323 (certain additional telecommunications services); § 151.330 (certain
formerly exempt sales of tangible personal property to a common carrier); § 151.317(c) (gas
and electricity sold for commercial purposes) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Several comptroller's
hearings interpreted this section as in effect prior to this revision. See, e.g., Comptroller Hear-
ing No. 20,795 (Mar. 18, 1987).
The Texas Legislature also codified as title 3 of the Texas Tax Code various city, county,
and other local tax laws, which previously existed throughout the Revised Civil Statutes. Act
of May 27, 1987, ch. 19, §§ 1-14 (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. tit. 3). (In general,
this codification makes no substantive changes of law.) The legislature also amended the Texas
Enterprise Zone Act (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.7 (Vernon 1987)), Act of June 19,
1987, ch. 765, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 5448 (Vernon), and exempted certain newspapers
and magazines sales from sales tax, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.319, .320 (Vernon Supp.
1988).
93. H.B. 61, art. 9. The statute also imposes the fee on: physicians; dentists; optometrists;
chiropractors; psychologists; CPAs; architects; engineers; real estate broker licensees; securi-
ties dealers; certain officers and salesmen; and veterinarians. These tax increases apply to all
fees that first become due on or after September 1, 1987, but before August 31, 1989.
94. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(g), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
95. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.1 IA (Vernon Supp. 1988).
96. Id. The legislature also imposed a temporary surtax on certain unauthorized insurers
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received by an insurance carrier (or certain "persons") under an administra-
tive service contract to be performed in Texas or on behalf of persons in
Texas or for risks located in Texas, and relating to any of a comprehensive
list of benefit plans. 97
Because the gross amount of the administrative or service fee includes not
only the total gross amount of all consideration received by the carrier, but
also the total amount of all claims and benefits paid to or on behalf of em-
ployers, employees, spouses, dependents, or other persons under a plan,98
the tax effectively applies to the gross benefits paid under a plan (subject to
certain exclusions). Under certain circumstances the tax applies to the wel-
fare plan rather than to the third-party administrator.99 It would appear
that federal law would preempt this tax to some extent, but substantial disa-
greement exists as to what extent. 10°
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. Calculation of Taxable Capital
Texas courts rendered few franchise tax decisions during the survey pe-
riod, but those few were significant. In Bullock v. Sage Energy Co. 101 the
Austin court of appeals held that the comptroller's rule'0 2 requiring corpo-
rations to capitalize, rather than expense, intangible drilling costs if the cor-
poration capitalizes such costs on its books and records violates the standard
of equal and uniform taxation set forth in the Texas Constitution. 0 3 The
Securities and Exchange Commission required Sage Energy, a publicly held
corporation, to capitalize its intangible drilling costs on its books and
records. Therefore, the comptroller required it to capitalize such costs on its
franchise tax report. The comptroller allowed taxpayers not regulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission to expense their intangible drilling
costs for franchise tax purposes if they did not capitalize such costs on their
books and records.
The taxpayer in Sage Energy asserted that the comptroller's rule with re-
spect to intangible drilling costs treated similarly situated taxpayers differ-
ently by requiring some corporations to capitalize such costs (thereby
including such costs in the corporations' taxable surplus, and increasing the
corporations' franchise tax liability) while allowing other corporations to ex-
pense intangible drilling costs. The taxpayer alleged that such unequal treat-
ment violated the Texas Constitution. The court agreed, stating that the
and insurance carriers. See id. art. 1.14-1(c), (h); art. 1.14-2(e); art. 4.10, § 10A; art. 4.11,
§ 5A; art. 9.59, § 4A.
97. Id. art. 4.1IA.
98. Id.; see id. § 3(2).
99. Id. art. 4.11A; see id. §4.
100. This tax, by the terms of the statute, applies only to the extent not preempted by
federal law. Id. See generally General Motors Corp. v. California State Bd. of Equalization,
600 F. Supp. 76 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (preemption of state tax on employee benefit plans).
101. 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.391(b)(1) (amended Mar. 19, 1984).
103. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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taxpayer paid "more franchise taxes than other similarly situated oil and gas
operating corporations" for enjoying the same value of the privilege of doing
business in Texas. 1°4
In State v. Sun Refining & Marketing, Inc. 105 the Austin court of appeals
held that taxable surplus should not include two reserve accounts reflecting
reasonable estimates of the taxpayer's liabilities.1° 6 One reserve account re-
flected expected liabilities pursuant to its self-insurance program. The cor-
poration made the entries in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. The other reserve account reflected estimates of amounts owed to
other oil companies pursuant to a federal program that required payments
between oil companies based on the price a company paid for crude oil in
comparison to the average price paid by the other oil companies for crude
oil. The events fixing liabilities with respect to this federal program had
already occurred, but the actual liability could not yet be determined.
The comptroller argued that reserve accounts should be included in sur-
plus unless they reflect absolute and fixed liabilities. The court held, how-
ever, that the events giving rise to the liabilities estimated in these reserve
accounts had occurred and the estimates of the liabilities were reasonable, so
the reserves should not be included in surplus.107 The court noted that in-
cluding these reserve accounts in the taxpayer's taxable surplus would not
provide an accurate picture of the corporation's present financial condi-
tion. 08 The court also stated that the comptroller's position with respect to
contingent reserve accounts conflicted with two Texas decisions holding that
analogous contingent reserve accounts should not be included in surplus. 109
104. 728 S.W.2d at 468. The court in Sage Energy awarded additional damages of $10,000
to the taxpayer because the comptroller disregarded a prior unpublished court of appeals deci-
sion that also held unconstitutional the rule at issue in Sage Energy. See Bullock v. Samedan
Oil Co., No. 14,146 (Tex. App.-Austin, Jan. 9, 1985, no writ). Although the court in Sage
Energy noted that the Samedan decision did not constitute precedent, the court stated that the
comptroller, as a servant of the state, should not disregard the decision. 728 S.W.2d at 469.
As a result of the Texas Supreme Court's refusal to issue a writ of error in Sage Energy, the
comptroller has established a task force to determine the amount of refunds due, if any, to
corporations that the comptroller had mandated capitalization of intangible drilling costs.
105. 740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
106. Id. at 555.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Texas Legislature enacted provisions in the 1987 regular session to address
the issues presented in the Sun Refining decision by defining "surplus" to include contingent
and estimated reserve accounts (with certain exceptions). See infra notes 154-56 and accompa-
nying text. Sun Refining and State v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 740 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1987, no writ) (discussed infra at notes 110-11) still carry enormous impact with re-
spect to years prior to the effective date of this new legislation.
109. See Huey & Philip Hardware Co. v. Shepperd, 151 Tex. 462, 468, 251 S.W.2d 515,
520 (1952) (reserve for bad debts); Calvert v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 369 S.W.2d 502,
510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reserve for deferred federal income
taxes). The court in Sun Refining also addressed the proper franchise tax treatment of a de-
ferred employee pension account. The taxpayer established a pension for its employees that
obligated the taxpayer to pay benefits for past work. Although the taxpayer paid these benefits
over ten years, it expensed the payments over thirty years to reflect more closely the fact the
benefits had been earned over a much longer period than ten years. This disparate accounting
treatment resulted in the liability on the accounting records being much less than the amounts
actually paid as pension benefits. The taxpayer booked this difference as a separate entry and
subtracted the amount from taxable surplus (although it recorded it as an asset on its balance
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In a related case, State v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware),I 0 the court reviewed
four reserve accounts reflecting contingent liabilities and held that all of the
reserves reflected reasonable estimates of liabilities, and that none of the ac-
counts should be included in surplus. 11  The reserve accounts at issue in-
volved estimated liabilities with respect to: (1) the regulation of the price of
natural gas already sold by the taxpayer; (2) lawsuits filed by royalty owners
in which taxpayer's counsel determined there was probable liability; (3) obli-
gations for removing drilling platforms; and (4) a current franchise tax audit
for which taxpayer's counsel and accountants believed that liability existed.
The comptroller also issued several noteworthy decisions during the sur-
vey period. In Decision 18,111112 the comptroller expressly overruled the
holding in Decisions 16,496' 13 and 16,603114 that the threshold test for de-
termining if a purported debt between related corporations should be treated
as a capital contribution for franchise tax purposes is whether there is a
provision for, and payment of, interest.15 The comptroller ruled in Deci-
sion 18,111 that the advances between the related corporations should be
treated as loans for franchise tax purposes in spite of the fact that the lender
charged zero percent interest on the advances. 116
In Decision 18,135' 17 the comptroller ruled that the taxable surplus of a
wholly owned subsidiary of a bank should not include property to which the
subsidiary had legal but not equitable title." 8 The subsidiary was a shell
corporation and merely acted as the parent's nominee or agent in acquiring
these properties.
sheet). Because amounts in this account were not available for use by the taxpayer, the court
ruled that the account should not be included in taxable surplus. Sun Refining, 740 S.W.2d at
556.
110. 740 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
111. Id. at 559. The court merely set forth the facts related to each reserve account with-
out an explanation of the applicable legal principles. Instead, the court made reference to the
principles set forth in the Sun Refining decision. Id.
112. Comptroller Hearing No. 18,111 (Jan. 16, 1987).
113. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,496 (Sept. 10, 1985).
114. Comptroller Hearing No. 16,603 (Oct. 18, 1985).
115. Comptroller Hearing No. 18,111 (Jan. 16, 1987).
116. The comptroller determines whether an obligation constitutes a debt on a case-by-case
basis, considering repayment history, whether the transaction is in writing, expectation of re-
payment and capitalization of the debtor, among other factors. See Comptroller Hearing No.
21,227 (May 14, 1987). Although Decision 18,111 clarifies the test applied in debt/equity
issues, two other decisions clouded the debt/equity test. In distinguishing between loans and
capital contributions, the comptroller considered the fact that the loan recipient could not have
obtained a similar loan on similar terms from an unrelated party. The comptroller agreed,
however, that the loan recipient could have borrowed the same amount of funds from an
unrelated entity. See Comptroller Hearing No. 17,870 (Jan. 16, 1987). In Comptroller Hear-
ing No. 18,784 (Apr. 9, 1987), however, the comptroller viewed the fact that the loan recipient
borrowed funds from a related entity only because it offered a lower interest rate to be an
indication that the purported loan was bona fide. These decisions appear to conflict directly.
117. Comptroller Hearing No. 18,135 (Apr. 10, 1987); see also Comptroller Hearing Nos.
18, 974, 18,975, 19,012 (June 2, 1987) (comptroller applied a "substance over form" approach
in treating purported advances to taxpayers from their sister corporation as capital contribu-
tions by the parent of the taxpayers to such taxpayers).
118. Comptroller Hearing No. 18,135 (Apr. 10, 1987).
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B. Allocation of Capital
In Decision 20,3961 '9 the comptroller interpreted the provision in the Tax
Code commonly called the "throw-back rule."' 20 The rule provides that
gross receipts from the sale of tangible personal property shipped outside the
state will be deemed to be Texas receipts if the seller is not subject to taxa-
tion in the state to which the property is shipped.' 2' The relevant comptrol-
ler's rule 22 states that the comptroller will apply the tests used to determine
whether a corporation is subject to Texas franchise tax (rule 3.406)123 to
determine whether a corporation is subject to taxation in the state to which
the property is delivered. This decision, however, provides that although the
comptroller applies the standards in rule 3.406, the presumption that the
foreign state's law with respect to determining if a corporation is subject to
taxation in that state falls if the law of such state is proved up. 124
In Decision 18,464125 the comptroller faced a unique situation involving
electricity sold and delivered via transmission lines running from outside
Texas into Texas. The parties had executed an agreement providing that the
sale was deemed to occur on the state line. The comptroller ruled that be-
cause the parties intended that "on the state line" meant on each respective
party's side of the state line, the taxpayer's sale took place outside Texas and
did not produce Texas receipts.' 26
C, Liability for Tax-Doing Business in Texas
The comptroller ruled in Decision 20,625127 that two holding companies
with no real property or employees in Texas were doing business in Texas
for franchise tax purposes.' 28 The corporations' relationship to Texas con-
sisted of borrowing funds from Texas (and non-Texas) banks, lending funds
to Texas (and non-Texas) subsidiaries, using employees of a subsidiary lo-
cated in Texas to maintain their accounting records, keeping the accounting
records and shareholder ledger in Texas, and using a letterhead showing a
Texas address when corresponding with lenders. One corporation also held
shareholders' and directors' meetings in Texas. The comptroller ruled that
the corporations' activities exceeded those of a mere passive holding com-
pany 129 because such activities involved more than merely receiving and
119. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,396 (Mar. 20, 1987).
120. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
121. Id.
122. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.403.
123. Id. § 3.406.
124. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,396 (Mar. 20, 1987).
125. Comptroller Hearing No. 18,464 (Feb. 25, 1987). The comptroller stated that this
decision carries no precedential value beyond interpreting ambiguous contracts in accordance
with the intent of the parties.
126. Id
127. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,625 (May 1, 1987).
128. Id.
129. In State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 263 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1924, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the Austin court of appeals held that owning a controlling amount of capital stock
of a Texas corporation does not, in itself, constitute doing business in Texas. Id. at 325.
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paying dividends.1 30 The comptroller identified a constitutional nexus to
Texas, based on the activities in which the corporations engaged.13'
Although withdrawn in accordance with a settlement by the parties,' 32 the
decision provides useful insight to the comptroller's broad interpretation of
"doing business."
In Decision 17,769133 the comptroller ruled that a foreign corporation,
which had no offices or employees in any state, conducted business in Texas
by virtue of using its parent corporation as an agent to sell certain communi-
cations equipment. 134 The taxpayer's only business activity consisted of
serving as an agent of its parent to sell this equipment. Fourteen percent of
the taxpayer's gross receipts were allocable to Texas. The comptroller con-
cluded that in order for the taxpayer to generate gross receipts it must have
had to "borrow" the employees of its parent (given that it had no employees
of its own). 135 The comptroller ruled that the taxpayer was doing business
in Texas, apparently based on the Texas receipts and the parent's Texas
activities. 136
D. 1987 Franchise Tax Legislation
Texas passed significant franchise tax legislation in 1987. The legislature
increased the franchise tax rate temporarily from $5.25 to $6.70 per $1,000
of a corporation's taxable capital allocable to Texas. 137 The minimum tax
per report year increased from $68.00 to $150.00.138 The rate increase ap-
plies to all regular report periods beginning on or after May 1, 1988, and for
which tax payments are due on or after March 15, 1988.139 The rate will
revert to the previous rates for regular reporting periods beginning on or
after May 1, 1990, and for which tax payments are due on or after March 15,
1990.140
The Texas Legislature added section 171.109141 of the Tax Code to define
surplus, net assets, and debts for franchise tax purposes. The Tax Code pre-
viously failed to define these terms, although the comptroller provided defi-
130. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,625 (May 1, 1987).
131. Id.
132. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,625 (Aug. 24, 1987) (dismissing case, in accordance with
agreement between parties).




137. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
138. Id
139. H.B. 61, art. 2, pt. 1, § 3. The temporary rate increase also applies to any initial
period that on January 1, 1988, has six months or longer before its expiration. Id. If the
temporary rate increase applies to a corporation's initial period it also applies to its second
period. Id. The comptroller, however, by rule may provide for the earlier application of the
rate increase to any reporting period in progress in January 1, 1988. Id.
140. H.B. 61, art. 2, pt. 2, § 2. The rate reversion also applies to initial periods that on
January 1, 1990, have six months or more remaining before their expiration. Id
141. Act of June 11, 1987, ch. 324 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 1170] (codified at TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
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nitions in his rules. 142 The new section also prescribes accounting methods
for determining surplus.
According to section 171.109, surplus refers to the excess of the net assets
of the corporation over its stated capital, 143 and net assets means total cor-
porate assets in excess of total corporate debts.44 The term "debt" includes
any legally enforceable obligation, measured in a certain amount of money,
which must be performed or paid within an ascertainable period of time or
on demand. ' 45 The new statute provides that surplus includes contingent or
estimated liabilities or losses or any writedown of assets, except for reserves
for uncollectible accounts, contra-asset accounts for depletion, depreciation,
or amortization, and reserves for deferred income taxes. 146 Thus, the new
statute sanctions (prospectively) the comptroller's treatment of contingent
and reserve accounts.147
The new statute also specifies that a corporation must use generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) to determine its surplus, except as
provided otherwise.' 48 Prior to the enactment of this statute, the comptrol-
ler had seemingly inconsistent requirements with respect to the use of
GAAP.' 49 Although a comptroller's rule supposedly required GAAP, 150
the comptroller did not allow GAAP in some circumstances' 3 ' and did not
require GAAP in other circumstances. 52 In a provision apparently in-
tended to prevent smaller corporations from incurring the additional ex-
pense of creating and maintaining an additional set of books in accordance
with GAAP solely for franchise tax purposes, the legislature provided that
corporations whose surplus for federal income tax purposes is less than one
142. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.405 (1977).




147. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
148. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The statute's provision
with respect to contingent and reserve accounts conflicts with GAAP, but deals with a circum-
stance in which GAAP does not control for franchise tax purposes.
149. See, e.g., United N. & S. Dev. Co. v. Heath, 78 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1934, writ ref'd) (comptroller held surplus created by reappraisal of assets includable in sur-
plus; no requirement that reappraisal be made in accordance with GAAP).
150. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. § 3.405 (1977).
151. A comptroller's rule also provided that preparation of franchise tax reports must be in
accord with taxpayers' books and records. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.391 (amended
1987). Therefore, to the extent that a taxpayer's books and records would reflect a higher
amount of taxable surplus than would exist pursuant to GAAP, the comptroller required, in
some circumstances, the use of the accounting method that would result in a higher amount of
taxable surplus. See Comptroller Hearing No. 19,330 (June 29, 1987) (required write-up of
assets for franchise tax purposes if a taxpayer writes-up assets on its books and records);
Comptroller Hearing No. 20,278 (May 16, 1987) (push-down accounting). After Sage Energy
(discussed supra, at notes 101-04 and accompanying text), this policy comes under serious
question even for report years prior to the effective date of this new legislation.
152. See Comptroller Hearing No. 13,035 (Sept. 26, 1983) (use of cash basis rather than
accrual basis, which GAAP requires). New § 171.109(b) of the Tax Code also provides that if
GAAP remains unsettled or does not specify a particular accounting practice for purposes
related to computing surplus, the comptroller may provide its own rules to specify the applica-




million dollars may report their surplus for franchise tax purposes according
to the method of accounting used in preparing their federal income tax
return. 153
New section 171.109(g) of the Tax Code provides that all oil and gas and
production activities must be reported for franchise tax purposes pursuant to
either the successful efforts or the full cost method of accounting, both of
which are methods of capitalizing intangible drilling cost rather than expens-
ing such costs. 1 54 This provision is a legislative response to Bullock v. Sage
Energy Co. 155 Certain new provisions apply to dividends and changes in
accounting methods.156
The legislature enacted new section 171.112 of the Tax Code, which de-
fines gross receipts as all revenues that would be recognized annually under a
GAAP method of accounting, without deduction for the cost of property
sold, materials used, labor performed, or other costs incurred, unless other-
wise specified. 157 This definition does not reflect a change in the comptrol-
ler's interpretation of the meaning of gross receipts. 158
The Texas Legislature added a new exemption from franchise taxes for
corporations whose only activity in Texas is the solicitation of orders on an
occasional basis at trade shows. 159 Amended section 171.063 of the Tax
Code expands the exemption from franchise tax afforded to nonprofit corpo-
rations by including title-holding corporations exempted from federal in-
come tax under sections 501(c)(2) or 501(c)(25) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. The exemption applies if the corporation or corporations for
which the entity holds title is either exempt from or not subject to Texas
franchise tax. 16 0
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. Application of Tax
In City of El Paso v. El Paso Community College District 161 the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that increases in ad valorem taxes of a school district
or community college district realized from property located in a reinvest-
ment zone may be pledged for repayment of bonds issued to finance develop-
153. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988). In addition, the statute
does not require corporations fitting within this exception to use GAAP in determining their
gross receipts allocable to Texas. Id. § 171.112.
154. Id. § 171.109(g).
155. 728 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App.-Austin, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussed supra at notes 101-
04 and accompanying text).
156. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.109(e), (f) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
157. Id. § 171.112.
158. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.403 (1987). The comptroller recently revised sev-
eral of the franchise tax rules to reflect the legislative changes to the franchise tax statutes
(most of the revisions remain in proposed form). See, e.g., 13 Tex. Reg. 1525, 1526, 1528, 1529
(TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, §§ 3.391, 3.403-.405) (proposed Mar. 23, 1988).
159. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.084.
160. Id. § 171.063. Sections 501(c)(2) and (25) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
exempt certain corporations that hold property for entities exempt from federal income tax
under section 501(c) of the Code. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(2), (25) (West Supp. 1987).
161. 729 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1986).
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ment or redevelopment of the zone.162 A 1981 amendment to the Texas
Constitution provides that the legislature may authorize an incorporated
town or city to issue bonds to finance the development or redevelopment of a
reinvestment zone and to pledge for repayment of such bonds increases in ad
valorem tax revenues imposed on property in the area by the city or town or
other political subdivisions. 163 The school districts claimed that under article
VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution the school districts' ad valorem
taxes must be used for educational purposes and cannot be seized without
the consent of the school districts' board of trustees. In order to harmonize
these seemingly inconsistent provisions of the Texas Constitution, the school
districts asserted that they should not be cast as "political subdivisions."' 6 4
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the framers of the 1981 amendment
meant the term "political subdivisions" to include school districts. 165
In Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Spurger Independent School District 166 the
Beaumont court of appeals interpreted section 23.78167 of the Tax Code,
which deals with timber land valuation. Section 23.73 of the Tax Code pro-
vides that qualified timber land is generally to be appraised based on income
capitalization methods rather than appraising the land based on its market
value, and section 23.78 states that the appraised value reached by using the
income capitalization method cannot be less than the taxing unit's appraised
value of such land in the 1978 tax year. 168 In arriving at the 1978 appraised
value of the taxpayer's parcel of timber land, the appraiser determined the
average 1978 appraised value per acre of the parcel and applied that value to
each acre of the parcel whose current timber use value was less than the
average 1978 per-acre value (i.e., an acre-by-acre approach). The city as-
serted that the 1978 appraised value of the land, as referred to in section
23.78 of the Tax Code, meant any portion of the parcel of qualified timber
land. The court held that the reference to the land applied to the entire
parcel of land appraised in 1978, and that the city improperly appraised the
1978 value of the taxpayer's parcel of timber land.1 69
162. Id. at 299.
163. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § l-g(b).
164. The Texas Supreme Court originally addressed only one of the school districts' three
constitutional challenges to the El Paso tax increment financing plan-that the school districts
were not "political subdivisions" within the meaning of art. VIII, § 1-g(b) of the Texas Consti-
tution. In addressing the school districts' motion for rehearing, however, the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the school districts' two other points of error (unconstitutionality of the El
Paso ordinance based on school district revenues pledged for noneducational purposes and so
committed without the consent of their respective boards of trustees) and held that the exist-
ence of such facts do not undermine the Texas Constitution. 729 S.W.2d at 299.
165. Id. The Texas Supreme Court relied on two Texas Supreme Court decisions that
support including school districts within the definition of political subdivision. See Guaranty
Petroleum Corp. v. Armstong, 609 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1980); Lewis v. Independent School
Dist., 139 Tex. 83, 87, 161 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1942).
166. 720 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
167. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.78 (Vernon 1982).
168. Id. §§ 23.73(a), 23.78.
169. This decision resulted in the 1978 appraised value setting a minimum taxable value
below which the appraised value of a qualified timber land parcel may not fall. Had the court
adopted the city of Austin's interpretation, a parcel of qualified timber land could conceivably
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In another opinion concerning special valuation of qualified property, the
attorney general ruled that a rollback tax should not be imposed on land that
failed to qualify for "open-space" land special valuation under current stan-
dards, because its use had not changed from the time when it did qualify for
special valuation.1 70 The attorney general ruled that the rollback tax under
section 23.55171 of the Tax Code can be imposed only if an actual change
takes place in the use of the land.1 72
B. Specific Exemptions
The Austin court of appeals in University Christian Church v. City ofAus-
tin 173 exempted from property tax two church parking lots leased to a com-
mercial parking lot company under an arrangement whereby the church
reserved certain parking rights.1 74 The court addressed the narrow issue of
whether the parking lots were used primarily as a place of religious worship
under section 1 1.20(a)(1) 175 of the Tax Code, and determined that the
church property must be examined as a whole rather than by using a piece-
meal approach. Because there was no evidence to support a finding that the
primary use of the sanctuary was not religious worship, the court ruled that
the church property, including the parking lots, was used primarily for reli-
gious worship.1 76 The City of Austin relied on Davies v. Meyer 177 in assert-
ing that the primary use of the parking lot should be examined apart from
the primary use of the church property as a whole. In Davies the Texas
Supreme Court held that all but 2 of 155 acres of a church-owned camp
failed to qualify for property tax exemption. 178 The court in University
Christian Church noted that in Davies religious worship occurred only on a
de minimus percentage of the property; therefore, the primary use of the
property as a whole was not religious worship. In this case, however, the
size of their parking lot was comparable to the needs of the membership;
therefore, no disproportionate use existed.' 79
The Dallas court of appeals denied a property tax exemption to a publicly
have a higher appraised value for the current year than its 1978 appraised value or its value
based on income capitalization methods.
170. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1667 (1987).
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.55 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1988).
172. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1667 (1987). In fact, in its 1987 regular session, the
Texas Legislature changed the definition of "qualified open-space land." See infra note 218
and accompanying text.
173. 724 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ granted).
174. Id. at 97. The church leased the parking lots for a monthly rental fee plus a percent-
age of the gross receipts.
175. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § l1.20(a)(l) (Vernon 1982).
176. 724 S.W.2d at 97.
177. 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1976).
178. Id. at 830. A recent case very similar to Davies is General Ass'n Branch Davidian
Seventh Day Adventist v. McLennan Co. Appraisal Dist., 715 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Waco
1986, no writ), in which the Waco court of appeals held that no exemption from property tax
existed for a 75-acre tract of land located adjacent to the taxpayer's church and parsonage.
179. 724 S.W.2d at 96. The court also held that renting church property for secular use
does not deprive the church of its property tax exemption as long as the primary purpose of the
property remains religious worship. Id. at 96.
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owned office building leased, in part, by private doctors in furtherance of
their own commercial enterprises.180 The taxpayer claimed an exemption
under section 11.1 (a)18 1 of the Tax Code, which provides an exemption for
property owned by the state or a political subdivision of the state if the prop-
erty is used for public purposes, and section 16 of article 4437e,8 2 which
provides an exemption from all taxation for property owned by a hospital
authority created under the Hospital Authority Act. The court ruled that
for an exemption to apply under either of these provisions the property must
be devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public; therefore, an ex-
emption was not allowed.' 8 3
An attorney general opinion' 8 4 held that in order for a biomedical re-
search corporation to qualify for a property tax exemption under section
11.23(h)' 85 of the Tax Code, it must meet not only the requirements of that
section but must also meet the requirement in the Texas Constitution that it
qualifies as an institution of purely public charity.18 6 The Texas Constitu-
tion'8 7 authorizes the legislature, by general law, to exempt from property
taxation only property of an institution of purely public charity. 188
C. Procedure
During the Survey period the courts continued to apply strictly the proce-
dural requirements set forth in the Tax Code. In a case of first impression,
the Houston (14th District) court of appeals held in Flores v. Fort Bend Cen-
tral Appraisal District 189 that the taxpayer's failure to file a petition in dis-
trict court within forty-five days after receiving an order of determination
from the appraisal review board caused the taxpayer to forfeit its right of
district court review of the appraisal review board's order. 90 Section
42.21(a)' 91 of the Tax Code provides that the taxpayer must file the petition
for review with the district court within forty-five days after the party re-
ceived notice of the entering of a final order from which an appeal is taken.
180. Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth. v. Dallas Co. Appraisal Dist., 730 S.W.2d 849 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
181. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.11(a) (Vernon 1982).
182. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4437e, § 16 (Vernon 1976).
183. 730 S.W.2d at 851. The court followed the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192, 9 S.W. 99 (1888), which held that the legislature lacks
the power to tax property held solely for public purpose and devoted exclusively to the use and
benefit of the public.
184. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-682 (1987).
185. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.23(h) (Vernon 1982) (repealed 1987). This exemption
still exists, although currently considered an exemption for a "charitable organization" rather
than a "miscellaneous exemption." See Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 430, § 1 (to be codified at
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18).
186. The courts have defined a purely public charity to be an institution making no profit,
accomplishing wholly benevolent ends, and preventing people, through gratuity, from burden-
ing society. See City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benev. Ass'n, 11l Tex. 191, 200, 230 S.W.
978, 981 (1921).
187. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a).
188. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-682 (1987).
189. 720 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
190. Id. at 245.
191. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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The taxpayer contended that the forty-five-day period did not begin to run
upon receipt of the order of determination of protest because the order of
determination did not constitute a final order. The court ruled that even
though the order of determination is not labeled as a final order,1 9 2 it oper-
ates as a final determination because the order leaves nothing else in
dispute.193
Two noteworthy decisions by the Texas courts of appeals addressed the
requirements of proper notice. In Uvalde County Appraisal District v. Kin-
caid Estate 194 the San Antonio court of appeals held that the taxpayer did
not receive proper notice of the reappraisal of his property because the tax-
ing authority failed to send the notice to the taxpayer's authorized agent
named on the last property rendition filed by the taxpayer. Rather, the no-
tice was sent to the name and address listed on the computer roll, 195 which
probably reflected the taxpayer's agent for a prior property tax year. 19 6 In
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Tarrant County Appraisal District 197 the
Fort Worth court of appeals held admissible into evidence a return receipt
for delivery of the county appraisal review board's order determining protest
of a corporate property owner. The return receipt established proper deliv-
ery of notice, although it contained only the taxpayer's name and address
without being directed to the attention of the appointed fiduciary. The
county sent the notice to the taxpayer at its correct address, to the attention
of its appointed fiduciary. Someone other than the fiduciary accepted the
notice. The fiduciary claimed he never personally received the notice. 198
Because the Tax Code requires only that the notice be delivered to the fiduci-
ary's address, the court admitted the certified mail receipt as evidence dem-
onstrating that the appraisal review board properly notified the taxpayer of
its order. 199
In Hunt County Tax Appraisal District v. Rubbermaid, Inc. 200 the Dallas
court of appeals held that the taxpayer forfeited its right to appeal the
county tax appraisal review board's order because the taxpayer made a vol-
untary payment of an alleged illegal tax by paying the full amount of the
property tax imposed on the property rather than paying the minimum
amount required to maintain an appeal.20 1 The taxpayer first asserted that
192. The court agreed with the taxpayer that the statute at issue could have been worded
more clearly, but still provided no relief to the taxpayer. 720 S.W.2d at 245.
193. Id. (citing Southern Union Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 690 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
194. 720 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. Id. at 680.
196. The court found no evidence that the notice was actually delivered to the authorized
agent for the tax year at issue. Id.
197. 723 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
198. Id. at 352.
199. The court also did not require the appraisal review board to send the taxpayer a sepa-
rate notice of issuance of its order and copy of the order itself; rather, in this case the order also
acted as a notice of issuance of the order. Id.
200. 719 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 218; see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Crystal City Indep. School Dist., 714 S.W.2d 74
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (because the taxpayer made payment of the
full amount in dispute without knowledge of the relevant facts, the court held the payment
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the full payment was "under protest," thereby entitling the taxpayer to an
appeal. The court ruled that the taxpayer forfeited its claim for refund by
making the voluntary payment, even if under protest.202 The taxpayer also
asserted that its payment was not voluntary because section 42.08 of the Tax
Code (as in effect for the 1982-83 tax years) required it to pay the greater of
the amount of taxes not in dispute (which was uncertain in this case) or the
amount of taxes paid on its property for the previous tax year, as a condition
to maintain an appeal of the board's order. The court held that the taxpayer
is not required to make full payment of the taxes assessed in order to comply
with the statutory requirement 20 3 because the statutory reference to the
amount of taxes not in dispute means the assessed value of the property that
the taxpayer does not dispute.2°4
The Dallas court of appeals in Dallas County Appraisal District v. Institute
for Aerobics Research 20 5 held that appraisal districts must file an appeal
bond under section 42.28 of the Tax Code to appeal a district court deci-
sion. 206 The Dallas County Appraisal District unsuccessfully asserted that
because section 42.28207 of the Tax Code exempts chief appraisers from such
requirements, the Tax Code implicitly exempts appraisal districts from filing
an appeal bond.
D. 1987 Property Tax Legislation
The Texas Legislature passed several important items of property tax leg-
islation during its 1987 regular and special sessions.208 In an era in which
the legislature is keeping a constant eye toward increasing revenues, taxpay-
ers benefited by the addition of section 31.12209 of the Tax Code. The
change provides for the accrual of interest at a rate of 1% per month on
certain refunds if the state fails to pay the refund on or before the sixtieth
day after the date the liability for the refund arises. 210 This new law applies
to refunds resulting from (1) an approval for a late application for a resi-
dence homestead exemption, (2) an election reducing the property tax rates,
(3) a correction of the tax roll, (4) an overpayment or erroneous payment
under section 31.11211 of the Tax Code, or (5) a final determination of an
involuntary); see also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Dallas Co. Appraisal Dist., 732 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) ("substantial" compliance with the minimum payment provisions
under § 42.08 of the Tax Code).
202. 719 S.W.2d at 218.
203. Id. at 219.
204. The court noted that although the taxpayer remained uncertain of the disputed
amount, it had several options. For example, it could have paid the previous year's taxes, paid
the taxes based on an appraisal, or paid taxes based on its estimate of the property's value. Id.
205. 732 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ granted).
206. Id. at 737.
207. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.28 (Vernon 1982).
208. During the 1987 regular and special sessions, the Texas Legislature either amended,
added, or repealed almost 70 of the Property Tax Code sections.
209. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.12 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
210. Id. § 31.12(a).
211. Id. § 31.11 (Vernon 1982).
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appeal of a taxpayer's protest. 21 2
The Texas Legislature also expanded the list of exemptions from property
tax. The legislature amended section 11.14 of the Tax Code to broaden the
exemption from property tax for the category of personal effects items.21
3
Pursuant to the amendment, exempt personal effects now include boats
owned and used by a family or individual for recreational activities and not
held or used for the production of income.214
New section 11.23(h) of the Tax Code entitles nonprofit corporations to
an exemption from property tax for property that they own and use in scien-
tific research and educational activities for the benefit of colleges and univer-
sities.2 15 Amended section 11.13 of the Tax Code includes in the definition
of a residence homestead real property owned by a cooperative association
and used as a dwelling place for its stockholders. 2 16 A new exemption also
exists for property under construction owned by a religious organization. 217
The Texas Legislature expanded the definition of qualified open-space
land, entitling the property to special appraisal. 218 Prior to this amendment
one of the criteria for determining if property qualified as open-space land
focused on whether it had been devoted principally to agricultural use for
five of the last seven years. Effective January 1, 1988, the land can be de-
voted principally to agricultural use or to production of timber or forest
products for five of the last seven years.2 19
The Texas Legislature made several changes to the procedures that a tax-
ing unit must follow in calculating its property tax rate. For example, new
section 26.012 of the Tax Code sets forth specific formulas for determining
212. In the 1987 regular session, the Texas Legislature also amended section 42.43 of the
Tax Code to entitle religious organizations interest of 10% per year on refunds generated by
erroneously denied exemptions. The interest accrues from the date of payment by the religious
organization. Id. § 42.43(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
213. Id. § ll.14(b)-(d).
214. The amendment provides, however, that the governing body of a taxing unit may
provide for the property taxation of such boats. This legislation is apparently a response to the
decision in Twiford v. Nueces Co. Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the
Texas Constitution did not exempt from property a boat used exclusively for recreational pur-
poses. Id. at 328. Amended § 11.14 of the Tax Code became effective May 26, 1987.
215. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.23(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The new statute also pro-
vides that the exemption remains valid if the property is used for a purpose incidental to its
scientific research and educational activities, which benefits the nonprofit corporation and the
colleges or universities it supports. Id.
216. Id. § 11. 13(o), (p). The attorney general interpreted the prior version of § 11.13 of the
Tax Code to exclude cooperative associations from the definition of a residence homestead.
217. Id. § 1l1.20(a)(5), (f). The land on which the property under construction is located
also qualifies for exemption to the extent it will be reasonably necessary for the religious organ-
ization's use of the improvement as a regular place of worship. Id. The Texas Legislature also
added an exemption from property tax for land dedicated as a disposal site for depositing and
discharging materials dredged from the main channel of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway
under the direction of state or federal government. Id. § 11.29.
218. Id. § 23.51. This revision also applies to qualification for productivity appraisal. Id.
§ 23.72.




the effective tax rate and the rollback tax rate.220 Amended section 26.04 of
the Tax Code requires the designated officer or employee of a taxing unit to
calculate both the effective tax rate and the rollback tax rate for the taxing
unit.221 The governing body of a taxing unit may not adopt a tax rate that
exceeds that lower of the rollback tax rate or 103% of the effective tax rate
unless it has held a public hearing on the proposed increase. 222 Another
change in rate calculation applies to the additional 1/2% local sales and use
tax under section 2A of article 1066c.223 In estimating the additional local
sales and use tax revenue to be raised by an adoption of this additional local
sales and use tax, the designated officer or employee of the taxing unit must,
for the first year of the additional tax, multiply by .95 the comptroller's esti-
mate of the additional local sales and use tax revenue for the preceding four
quarters. 224
The Texas Legislature also changed several procedural requirements with
respect to protests and appeals of property taxes and property tax appraisals.
One change requires that all notices of issuance of an appraisal review
board's order determining a protest sent to the property owner must contain
a prominently printed statement in upper-case bold lettering informing the
property owner of its right to appeal.225 Effective January 1, 1987, new re-
quirements apply with respect to filing a notice of appeal of an appraisal to a
district court from an order of an appraisal review board.226 Under
amended section 41.47(b) of the Tax Code, if the appraised value of a frac-
tional property interest changes as the result of a protest or challenge, the
appraised value of the other fractional interests of such property must also
change.2
27
The Tax Code amendment under section 25.195 provides that a property
owner or his designated agent may inspect only the appraisal records and the
supporting data and schedules thereto submitted to the appraisal review
board by the chief appraiser that relate to the property owner's property. 228
Effective January 1, 1988, the law prohibits taxing units created after June
220. Id. § 26.012.
221. Id. § 26.04.
222. Id. § 26.05(c).
223. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Vernon Supp. 1988).
224. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.041(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988). This Act essentially re-
pealed a prior act of the 1987 Texas Legislature with respect to the same section. See Act of
Apr. 2, 1987, ch. 12, § 11, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 69 (Vernon).
225. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.47(e) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Strangely, the Act of May
21, 1987, ch. 145, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 604 (Vernon) made a similar but slightly
different amendment adding § 41.47(e) of the Tax Code. The prior amendment requires the
statement to be in "clear and concise language," whereas the latter amendment does not so
provide.
226. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
227. Id. § 41.47(b). The Texas Legislature also provided that in a suit to enforce collection
of delinquent taxes, the taxpayer can raise two affirmative defenses: (1) In a suit to enforce
personal liability for the tax, that the taxpayer did not own the property on January 1 of the
year the tax was imposed; and (2) in a suit to foreclose a lien securing payment of a real
property tax, that on January 1 of the year the tax was imposed the property was not located in
the taxing unit seeking to foreclose a lien. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.19 (Vernon Supp.
1988). Previously the Tax Code did not specify any affirmative defenses.
228. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.195 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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30 from imposing taxes for the year in which they are created.229 Prior to
this amendment to section 26.12 of the Tax Code, if a taxing unit was cre-
ated at any time during the year after January 1, the statute required the
chief appraiser to prepare an appraisal roll as if the unit had existed on Janu-
ary 1.230
IV. TAX PROCEDURE
Both the Texas Legislature and the comptroller have made changes re-
garding the procedures for challenging taxes imposed by the comptroller. 231
A motion for rehearing of a refund claim and a suit for refund now must set
forth the amount of refund sought; in addition, a copy of the motion for
rehearing must be attached to the original petition in a suit for refund. 232
The original petition in a suit after protest payment must have a copy of the
written protest attached. 233 New section 112.058(d) 234 of the Tax Code
eliminates suspense account treatment for protest payments with respect to
sales tax, franchise tax, and other taxes.2 35
During the Survey period the comptroller amended virtually every rule
with respect to practice and procedure. The more significant changes in-
clude limiting hearings to two hours unless cause is demonstrated for an
extended hearing, 236 restricting the admission of certain documentary evi-
dence by a taxpayer after filing the statement of grounds, 237 eliminating the
payment of interest by the comptroller on refunds of taxes,238 and limiting
taxpayers' ability to present additional facts in a reply to the position
letter.239
V. CONCLUSION
The Survey period has seen numerous legislative, regulatory, 240 and judi-
cial developments in Texas taxation. Undoubtedly there will be continuing
changes, including the issuance of many new administrative rules in the
coming months. The Select Committee on Tax Equity will recommend fur-
229. Id. § 2612.
230. Id.
231. The Texas Legislature also adopted new collection procedures, including additional
collections methods for state taxes. See id. §§ 111.016-.022. These new provisions deal, inter
alia, with sales of seized property, transferee liability, and levies placed on certain assets.
232. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.105(d), 112.151(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
233. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
234. H.B. 61, art. 10, § 1 (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.058(d)).
235. In general, amounts paid under protest for the taxes to which § 112.658(d) applies will
be deposited in the general revenue fund. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 34, § 3.325 (1987).
236. Id. § 1.12.
237. Id. § 1.5.
238. Id. § 3.55 (repealed 1987).
239. Id. § 1.15 (1987).
240. Numerous administrative rules were proposed and adopted in addition to those dis-
cussed herein and many of the rules cited herein will have been modified prior to publication of
this Article. Verification of the status of administrative rules is therefore essential. In addi-
tion, the effective date of the rules may be critical in contesting tax assessments. See Comptrol-
ler Hearing No. 17,587 (May 20, 1987) (refusing to hold taxpayer to standards set forth in
rules promulgated after the taxpayer's transaction).
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ther changes. 241 As these changes illustrate, it is becoming not only more
expensive to pay Texas taxes, but also more difficult to stay informed as to
the rapidly changing law.
241. This committee was authorized by the legislature to study and make recommenda-
tions as to major state and local tax issues. Act of Mar. 30, 1987, ch. 10, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law.
Serv. 52 (Vernon). A final report of the committee's findings should be completed prior to the
January 1989 convening of the next legislative session.
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